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ABSTRACT 
While there has been much judicial discussion regarding the competency of 
Australia’s continuous disclosure regime with reference to contemporaneous 
international standards, there has to date been limited empirical analysis of the 
Australian system’s effectiveness in preventing selective disclosure and 
information leakage. This paper presents an empirical study of information 
content and trading behaviour around unscheduled earnings announcements – 
comprising of profit upgrades, profit warnings and neutral trading statements – 
made by ASX-listed companies during 2004. The contention is that informed 
trading impacts on the stock returns and trading volumes of listed entities, and 
hence abnormal returns or trading volumes observed prior to an announcement 
provide evidence of information leakage. The paper models a range of factors that 
potentially influence firm disclosure practices and contribute to the level 
information asymmetry in the market during the pre-announcement period. 
Previous research has investigated the influence of firm size and information 
content in contributing to information leakage. This study further considers the 
variables of firm growth, capital structure and industry group. 
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INFORMATION LEAKAGE AND INFORMED TRADING AROUND 




Transparency and disclosure are central pillars of effective corporate governance 
practices and the functioning of capital markets. From an investment perspective, full, 
accurate and timely disclosure of information permits the market to determine intrinsic value. 
Without access to regular, timely, reliable and comparable information, investors will not be 
able to evaluate corporate prospects and make informed investment and voting decisions 
(OECD, 2003b). This will result in poorer allocation of scarce economic resources and a 
higher cost of capital. Additionally, disclosure and transparency are the building blocks of a 
market-based system for monitoring companies. Effective disclosure and transparency help 
set investors’ level of confidence that intrinsic value is not being siphoned off or wasted by 
managers or insiders. It allows shareholders and the public at large to assess management 
performance, thus influencing its behaviour (OECD, 2003b). 
The genuine value of cash flows, combined with investors’ confidence in their ability 
to enjoy these cash flows, determines a company’s extrinsic, or market value. A similar 
relationship is found at the macroeconomic level. Reliable systemic disclosure generates 
confidence in market integrity. As a result, capital flowing to equity and debt markets will 
fully and fairly reflect the underlying value of the national economy (OECD, 2003a). 
Consequently, disclosure and transparency not only affect individual companies’ 
performance and market valuation, but also greatly influence a national economy’s ability to 
attract domestic and foreign investment. Finally, transparency and disclosure gives the public 
the opportunity to understand the company’s structure, activities and policies as well as 
assessing its performance with regard to environmental and ethical standards (OECD, 
2003b).  
Much of the recent discussion surrounding Australia’s corporate disclosure 
regulations is comprised of notional pieces comparing contemporary international standards 
and regimes. Contrastingly, there has been limited empirical analysis of Australia’s corporate  
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disclosure rules and the presence of information asymmetry in Australian markets. A detailed 
practical analysis of the effectiveness of Australia’s disclosure regulations in preventing 
selective disclosure and information leakage is required to assess the adequacy of the current 
system. 
Continuous disclosure can be defined as an obligation to promptly disclose new 
important information concerning a listed company as the information becomes available. 
This can be contrasted with periodic disclosure, which in the Australian context requires the 
preparation of annual and half-year disclosure documents. A central function of Australia’s 
continuous disclosure regulations is to create a platform that equally distributes price 
sensitive information (PSI) and maintains an efficient market. Privileged access to material 
information by analysts, media and major shareholders creates favourable conditions for 
market manipulation and insider dealings, and consequently harms the integrity of financial 
markets and general public confidence in securities. The regulation of disclosure naturally 
becomes a most important part of securities regulation and the focus of regulatory action 
Australia has been a leader in the development of a regulatory response to the policy 
issues raised by the challenges of continuous and selective disclosure over the past decade. 
While there has been much judicial discussion regarding the competency of Australia’s 
continuous disclosure regime with reference to contemporaneous international standards, 
there has to date been limited empirical analysis of the Australian system’s effectiveness in 
preventing selective disclosure and information leakage around earnings information 
announcements. 
Since September 5, 1994, statutory provisions have expressly supported the 
Australian Stock Exchange’s (ASX) continuous disclosure requirements.
1 While the ASX 
takes primary responsibility for monitoring and enforcing compliance with the disclosure 
requirements of the listing rules, the Australian Securities and Investment Commission 
(ASIC) has the primary responsibility for enforcing the underpinning statutory provisions. 
The continuous disclosure requirements of the ASX are contained in Chapter 3 of the ASX 
Listing Rules. The general rule, in accordance with Listing Rule 3.1, is that once an entity 
becomes aware of any information concerning it that a reasonable person would expect to 
have a material effect on the price or value of the entities securities, the entity must 
                                                 
1 The provisions were inserted into the Corporations Law by the Corporate Law Reform Act, 1994  
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immediately inform the ASX of that information.
2 Price sensitive information includes 
information about such things as earnings, mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures, changes in 
assets, new products or discoveries, developments regarding customers or suppliers (e.g. 
winning or losing a contract) and changes in control or management (ASIC, 2000). Listing 
Rule 3.1 is augmented by the operation of Rule 15.7, which provides that all price sensitive 
information must first be provided to the ASX. In addition, a firm may not make further 
disclosure to anyone until it has received an acknowledgement from the ASX that the 
information has been released to the market. Rule 15.7 is designed to ensure that the 
efficiency and integrity of the process of releasing market information is maintained, making 
the Company Announcements Platform the central collection point for all price sensitive 
information (ASX, 2003). Risk of informed trading activity and unequitable access to 
information is therefore significantly reduced, as the ASX acts as the initial conduit through 
which information is widely disseminated. 
Under Australia’s current continuous disclosure regime, it should be impossible to 
leak information: Either all investors hear news at once, or none do. Assuming the market is 
efficient, changes in security prices reflect the flow of new information to the market. Thus 
abnormal trading volume or price movements witnessed immediately prior to the release of 
price-sensitive unscheduled company announcements would provide evidence of information 
leakage and informed investor trading (Collett, 2004). 
This study examines information content and trading behaviour around unscheduled 
earnings announcements – consisting of profit upgrades, profit warnings and neutral trading 
statements – made by ASX-listed companies during 2004. The analysis of earnings forecasts 
are particularly relevant as these notices provide a clear signal to the market that management 
of the firm has revised their expectations, or believes that current analyst or market 
projections are inaccurate. Other types of irregular announcement are not considered in this 
study as they may provide an ambiguous signal to the market, or have variable information 
content which is conditioned by the firm’s trading history. Therefore, unlike earnings 
forecasts, ambiguous disclosures create difficulties in assigning an a priori expectation of the 
market’s response to the new information. The study will focus on the pre-announcement 
                                                 
2 ASX Listing Rule 3.1 has been amended on a number of occasions over the last 15 years. The current 
formulation has been effective since 1 July 2003, and was amended to clarify the operation of the exceptions 
from disclosure and to reinforce the false market provisions.  
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period to test for information asymmetry and informed trading prior to the official release of 
the earnings information through the ASX Company Announcements Platform. 
 
Further, this study will attempt to identify the variables, or firm characteristics, that 
influence firm disclosure practices and contribute to the level information asymmetry in the 
market during the pre-announcement period. Previous research has investigated the influence 
of firm size and information content in contributing to information leakage. This study 
further considers the variables of firm growth, capital structure and industry group. We 
consider a firms capital structure to be of interest as the level of debt financing adopted by a 
firm heavily influences the riskiness of its business. As profit forecasts provide early 
indications of a firm’s continued ability to service its debt requirements, firms may be more 
precautious with negative information in attempt to minimise its impact when released to the 
market. A firm’s growth in trading revenue indicates recent performance and identifies those 
firms which may be expanding or contracting appreciably. Poor performing firms may be 
increasingly reluctant to release negative information, while conversely, prosperous firms 
would likely increase disclosure to improve the marketability and value of their securities. 
Finally, industry associations are considered to assist detecting variations in corporate culture 
across industries. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section II provides an overview 
of the empirical literature to date concerning information leakage and selective disclosure, 
and then develops the hypotheses to be addressed. Section III discusses the sample and 
develops the methodology adopted, while Section IV reports the findings of the empirical 
analysis accompanied by a brief discussion and Section V states the conclusions of the 
findings. Policy implications of the results are outlined, and areas of further research are 
suggested. 
II : LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Informed Trading around Earnings Announcements 
A review of the literature indicates that the imposition of statutorily enforced 
disclosure rules has been largely successful in reducing or eliminating information leakage  
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and informed trading, in particular around earnings announcements. Helbok and Walker 
(2003) report that evidence of informed trading prior to the release of profit warnings by UK 
firms does not continue after the introduction of a continuous disclosure obligation. This 
finding is supported by Collett (2004) who finds no evidence of informed trading in any of 
his size categories prior to trading statements made by UK firms in the post-enactment 
period. Dedman (2004) acknowledges that this combined contribution to the UK disclosure 
literature suggests that recent changes to market regulation in the UK have reduced informed 
trading around earnings updates to insignificant levels. Similar findings were observed in the 
USA by Mac (2002), who reports an abatement in unfair trading around earnings 
announcements subsequent to the introduction of Regulation FD prohibiting selective 
disclosure by US firms. The study by Jackson and Madura (2003) examined the release of 
profit warnings by US firms and found evidence to suggest larger firm size and negative 
information content as contributing factors to increased information asymmetry observed 
prior to earnings announcements. However, this latter study employed data prior to the 
introduction of Regulation FD.  
There is a gap in the literature however, with respect to studies performed on 
Australian markets. There has to date been limited empirical analysis of Australia’s corporate 
disclosure rules and the presence of information asymmetry around earnings information 
announcements. However, there are some related studies that focus related disclosures and 
frequency of disclosures.  
Aitken and Czernkowski (1992) measure unexpected returns and trading volume prior 
to the announcement of Australian takeover offers, during the period 1982 to 1987. The study 
finds that when the information contained in media reports leaking news before the official 
announcement is controlled for, a significant proportion (30%) of the price and volume run-
up could be eliminated or explained. Their study also found significant abnormal returns 4 
days prior to the media-adjusted announcement date. 
In a series of working papers commissioned by the Australian Securities Commission 
(ASC
3), the Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia Pacific (SIRCA) reviewed 
Australia’s enhanced disclosure (ED) rules by attempting to identify the impact on listed 
firms’ disclosure practices, and the market reaction to those disclosures (Brown et al., 1999, 
                                                 
3 Now the Australian Investments and Securities Commission (ASIC)  
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Brown et al., 1996c, Brown et al., 1996b, Brown et al., 1996a).
4 Their results generally 
indicated that although total disclosures increased post-sanctions, disclosures classified as 
‘price sensitive’ by the ASX only became more frequent for firms without a large analyst 
following and for firms which are more likely to have revealed relatively bad news. While 
their research incorporated all disclosures made in accordance with Listing Rule 3.1, and did 
not explicitly consider information leakage around announcement events, their results 
identified the marginal effects of ED on company disclosure policies which have been 
reflected in current international literature. Namely, there is some evidence that both 
company disclosure policies, and the level of informational asymmetry in the market prior to 
price sensitive announcements, is conditional upon firm size and whether the informational 
content of the announcement is positive or negative for the disclosing firm. 
 
2.2 The Frequency and Effect of Positive and Negative Announcements 
A belief that ED legislation would modify corporate disclosure policies ultimately 
reduces to an expectation that the introduction of civil and criminal sanctions will have such 
an effect (Brown et al., 1996c). Skinner (1994) develops an argument based on the 
expectations adjustment hypothesis of Ajinyka and Gift (1984), which states that the 
probability an earnings announcement will be pre-empted by voluntary disclosures depends 
on the absolute size of the earnings surprise. Skinner further argues that due to legal 
incentives to voluntarily disclose, US firms are much more likely to reveal ‘bad’ earnings 
news in advance than they are to foreshadow earnings improvements. 
Collett (2004) demonstrated that both the number of negative trading statements and 
their absolute impact was much higher than the number and impact of positive trading 
statements. Similarly, Kasznic and Lev (1995) find that twice as many US firms issue pre-
emptive warnings about negative earnings surprises than issue early indicators of positive 
earnings surprises. Interestingly, Mac (2002) reports that there was comparatively less 
information leakage for positive surprises than negative surprises, in both the pre- and post- 
Regulation FD period. 
                                                 
4 Since September 5, 1994, statutory provisions have expressly supported the ASX Continuous Disclosure 
Requirements. Ss.793C and 1101B of the Corporations Act allow a court to order compliance with any ASX 
Listing Rule or to make consequential orders on a contravention of any ASX Listing Rule.  
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2.3 The Impact of Firm Size 
The firm-size differential information hypothesis is provided by Atiase (1980), who 
proposes that the amount of private pre-disclosure information production and dissemination 
is an increasing function of firm size (market capitalization). This is supported by Ryan and 
Taffler (2004) who argue that periodic accounting reporting is an anticipated news release 
and thus generates extensive prior search activity (e.g. through the earnings forecasting 
activities of analysts). Other information events however, including those made under a 
continuous disclosure obligation, occur randomly and cannot be predicted in the same way 
without incurring substantial speculative search costs. 
Given company size is shown to be a proxy for the number of analysts following 
companies, Collet (2004) found strong evidence that the market is less surprised by trading 
statements from companies which are followed by numerous analysts. Further to this, his 
results indicated that while profit warnings for large companies produce significant negative 
abnormal returns on announcement day, the abnormal returns are negligible and insignificant 
for upgrades. Jackson and Madura (2003) found that the response to profit warnings during 
the announcement period and post-announcement period is more negative for small firms. It 
may be concluded that as analysts monitor large firms more closely than they monitor small 
firms, earnings information disclosed by small firms is less likely to be anticipated.  
2.4  Other Factors 
Whereas price adjustments identify changes in the market’s consensus expectations, 
irregular trading volume can reflect heterogeneous expectations of individual investors 
(Bamber, 1986, Collett, 2004). To the extent that information is leaked to individuals, a firm 
may experience abnormal levels of trading volume prior to an unscheduled announcement. 
However, if Australia’s continuous disclosure regime is effective, information leakage and 
hence information asymmetry should not be present in the Australian market. We will also 
consider abnormal volume effects surrounding unexpected earnings announcements.  
The level of information asymmetry and information leakage prior to information 
releases can be attributed to a firm’s willingness to engage in selective disclosure practices. 
Given the potential legal and reputation costs of breaching disclosure rules, it is proposed  
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that unobservable motivations induce management to engage in selective disclosure. 
Therefore, the pre-announcement period can be used to test whether company disclosure 
policies are conditioned by discrete firm characteristics. Previous research has investigated 
the influence of firm size and information content in contributing to information leakage. 
This study further considers the variables of firm growth, capital structure and industry 
group. 
The effect of firm growth has not been considered by the prior literature. While we 
can form predictions regarding the influence the variable might have on the magnitude of 
abnormal returns (i.e. tendency to magnify or offset the information contained in the 
announcement), it is more difficult to form an a priori expectation concerning whether it 
would influence a firm’s willingness to leak information. Firms experiencing financial 
difficulties would appreciably be cautious of the manner in which negative information is 
released to the market.  
The firm’s debt to equity ratio is considered to asses whether the level of debt 
financing (risk) employed by a firm influence its tendency to selectively disclose to favoured 
shareholders. As with firm growth, capital structure has not been considered as an 
independent variable by previous studies. Accordingly, we again have no pre-determined a 
priori expectation concerning its relationship with the magnitude of pre-announcement 
CARs. As a firm’s trading revenue growth indicates recent financial performance, it may be 
used to identify firms that are be expanding or contracting. which may lead to less pre-
announcement leakage. 
A firm’s industry group is also considered by this study according to its four-digit 
Global Industry Classification System (GICS) code. This classification has also been 
overlooked by the supporting literature. Once again, no a priori expectation is advanced. The 
variable is considered to test whether corporate culture, and the willingness to leak price-




III : RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
The objective of this study is to test for information leakage and informed trading in 
the Australian stock market, prior to the release of unscheduled earnings announcements. The 
contention is that informed trading impacts on the stock returns and trading volumes of ASX-
listed firms, and hence abnormal returns and trading volumes prior to an announcement 
would provide evidence of information leakage. 
The initial data set comprises the complete set of announcements made by ASX-listed 
firms under their continuous disclosure obligations. The full electronic text of 
announcements made by ASX-listed firms is distributed through Signal-G electronic records, 
and subsequently archived on the DatAnalysis Image Signal database. The ASX attaches 
two-digit event codes to all Signal-G transmissions; this study focuses on item 14 (‘Other’) 
announcements that have also been flagged as price sensitive by ASX staff. 
The study considers all announcements made during the sample period extending 
from January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2004. In total, 3,564 price-sensitive, unscheduled 
announcements were made during the period. Of these, 489 announcements were identified 
as containing forecast earnings information. To narrow the study focus on unscheduled 
earnings announcements, a number of announcements containing potentially confounding 
information were excluded from the sample. First, announcements that provide actual 
earnings or sales figures along with some indication of future earnings are eliminated, as the 
current trading results could bias the market response. Second, announcements including 
information such as dividend declarations, equity issues, substantial asset sales or 
administrative matters are eliminated, as the market reaction could otherwise not be fully 
ascribed to the earnings forecast. Firms are also excluded for insufficient data, where 
unscheduled announcements were made concurrently with annual or interim reports, or for 
the presence of confounding events or price sensitive announcements within a five-day 




TABLE 1 - SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS OF UNSCHEDULED EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS 
Classification of all unscheduled earnings announcements by ASX-listed firms distributed through Signal-G 
electronic records by industry and announcement type for the period January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2004. 
Descriptive statistics for the size of firms included in the sample is denoted by market capitalisation one-day 
prior to the announcement and is in millions of A$. 
 
Industry Group  GICS Code    Upgrade   Neutral     Warning   Total 
Energy  1010  2 1    0 3 
Materials  1510  14 0    12  26 
Capital Goods  2010  13 0    6 19 
Commercial Services & Supplies  2020  5 0    5  10 
Transportation  2030  0 0    4 4 
Automobiles & Components  2510  1 0    2 3 
Consumer Durables & Apparel  2520  3 1    3 7 
Consumer Services  2530  7 1    4  12 
Media  2540  5 2    2 9 
Retailing  2550  6 3    3  12 
Food & Staples Retailing  3010  3 2    0 5 
Food, Beverage & Tobacco  3020  7 2    9  18 
Health Care Equipment & Services  3510  3 1    3 7 
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology  3520  5 0    0 5 
Banks  4010  0 3    2 5 
Diversified Financials  4020  16 3    2 21 
Insurance  4030  3 0    0 3 
Real Estate  4040  5 2    1 8 
Software & Services  4510  8 2    5  15 
Technology Hardware & Equipment  4520  1 0    3 4 
Telecommunication Services  5010  2 1    1 4 
Utilities  5510  2 0    1 3 
Total   111  24    68  203 
                   
                             
Market Capitalisation (,000,000)             
Mean: 814.26  5315.20    1626.32  1626.28
Median: 124.53  310.76    31.70  87.33 
                             
 
The final sample constitutes 203 unscheduled earnings announcements, as described in 
Table 1. The sample is divided into announcements that may be classified as a profit 
upgrade, a profit downgrade (warning), or a neutral trading statement to permit analysis of 
the information content of each announcement. Defining conclusively an upgrade, neutral 
trading statement, or profit warning requires a pre-existing market expectation or 
management forecast. As identified in previous studies, numerical forecasts are often not  
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provided; instead, phrases such as ‘above market expectations’ were common. Accordingly, 
we adopted an approach similar to that espoused by Collett (2004) to classify the statements: 
‘Whilst we could have confined ourselves to unambiguous statements containing a clear 
signal relative to prior expectation, it was decided that there were sufficient statements 
exuding optimism or pessimism, but without existing market expectations, to adopt a 
more judgemental approach.’ (Collett, 2004 p.8) 
The content of each announcement and the trading data for disclosing entities is obtained 
from the Bloomberg and DatAnalysis databases. Trading data to be examined includes both 
stock returns and trading volumes around the announcements. The study will also examine 
the effect of specific firm characteristics and the information content of the earnings 
announcement. 
3.1 Measuring Valuation Effects of Information Leakage 
Event-study procedures are used to calculate the abnormal pre-announcement returns 
over several windows ranging in length from one to thirty days. Measuring abnormal returns 
before the announcement is a means commonly adopted to identify changes in the market’s 
consensus expectations generated by new information, by distinguishing significant firm-
specific price movements from market wide fluctuations (Beaver, 1968, Collett, 2004). 
The abnormal return in any given period is the adjusted market model residual, which 
is the difference between the stock’s actual return and the predicted return based on the 
adjusted market model return for that period.  Continuously compounded actual daily stock 
and market index return for each day are employed in the market model estimates and 
measures of the actual stock return.  
The potentials for bias of the OLS βi (beta) from the market model due to 
nonsynchronous data have been widely recognised, and are particularly relevant in Australian 
markets. This study adopts the Scholes & Williams (1977) adjusted beta to avoid the bias 
associated with the estimation of parameters using daily returns for securities with infrequent 
trading. The Scholes-Williams procedure involves the estimation of three simple OLS 
regressions using the T daily returns within the estimation period:  
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The Scholes Williams estimates for each individual company announcement are 
calculated using returns during a 200-day estimation period, ending 30 days before the event 
date [-230, -31].  
 
(1)     ( ) t t m i i it R R 1 , 1 1 μ β α + + =   for  t = 1, 2, …, T 
(2)     () t t m i i it R R 2 1 , 2 2 μ β α + + = +   for t = 1, 2, …, T-1 
(3)     ( ) t t m i i it R R 3 1 , 3 3 μ β α + + = −   for t = 2, 3, …, T 
 
The Scholes-Williams adjusted beta is then formed as follows: 
 












Rm,t+1 is the return on market in period t+1; 
Rm,t-1 is the return on market in period t-1; 
βik is the estimated OLS coefficients for k =1, 2, and 3; 
  βiSW is the adjusted Scholes-Williams beta; and 
ρ is the estimated OLS coefficient of Rm,t on Rm,t-1 (the correlation coefficient)
5; 
 
The corresponding Scholes-Williams adjusted α (alpha) is formed as follows: 
 

































mt iSW it iSW R R
T
β α  
Where: 
  αiSW is the Scholes-Williams adjusted alpha. 
 
                                                 
5  ()






R Var R Var
R R Cov
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The adjusted alpha and beta of the market model are then used to calculate the 
predicted returns of each observation during a 36-day event window [-30, 5]. The market 
model residual abnormal returns (AR) for each observation during the event window are 
calculated as follows: 
 
 
(6)     ( ) it it it R E R AR − =  
Where: 
  ARit is the abnormal return for firm i on day t; and 
E(Rit) is the expected return of the stock based on 200-day Scholes-Williams adjusted 
betas for each firm i. 
 
The observations are segregated into three sub-samples, consisting of profit upgrades, 
profit warnings, and neutral trading statements. Abnormal returns are averaged across N 
firms for each sub-sample, giving the average abnormal return (AAR) for each event day: 
 





t ∑ =  
Where: 
  AARt is the average abnormal return on day t. 
 
Additionally, for the analysis of valuation effects over multiple event days, the 
cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) was calculated: 
 








t w AAR CAAR  
Where: 
CAARW is the cumulative average abnormal return over an event window W days in 
length; and 
  t1 & t2 are the first and last event dates, respectively, of event window W. 
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An estimate of the standard deviation was calculated using the 200-day estimation 
period returns [-230, -31], which excludes the influence of any increased in variance around 
the event date: 
 









t AAR AAR AAR S  
Where: 
  SAAR is the standard deviation of the average abnormal return; and 
  AAR is the mean average abnormal return over the 200-day estimation period. 
 
Using the standard deviation estimate, upper-tail, lower-tail and two-tailed tests were 
performed to gauge the significance of both AARs and CAARs. All hypotheses were 
accepted or rejected according to the t-statistic, formulated as follows: 
 














One-tailed tests were applied to the AARs and CAARs of upgrades (downgrades), 
given the a priori expectation that the leakage of positive (negative) information would lead 
to an increase (decrease) in price. Specifically, upgrades were tested against a null hypothesis 
of AARs and CAARs being less than or equal to zero, while the null hypothesis for 
downgrades stated AARs and CAARs greater than or equal to zero. Two-tailed tests were 
performed for the AARs and CARs of neutral trading statements, given the a priori 
expectation of nil information content. A null hypothesis of AARs and CAARs equal to zero 
was applied. 
 
3.2 Measuring Volume Effects of Information Leakage 
In contrast to price movements, which reflect a change in the market’s consensus 
expectations, measuring trading volume activity before the announcement is a means used to 
identify heterogeneous expectations of individual investors (Bamber, 1986, Collett, 2004).  
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Measuring unexpected trading volume requires a benchmark for expected trading volume. 
Collett (2004) identifies the percentage of a firm’s outstanding shares trading on a given day, 
as opposed to normal daily volume, as an appropriate measure due to its ability to adjust for 
equity issues during the sample period. Daily volume for each day in the sample period is 
calculated as follows: 
 







  VOLit is the volume for firm i on day t; 
  SHRTRDit is the number of firm i's shares traded on ASX on day t, and 
  SHROUTit is the number of firm i's shares outstanding on day t. 
 
Abnormal volume (AVOL) is then calculated as the residual of daily volume less 
mean daily volume during the estimation period, and is estimated for each observation during 
a 36-day event window [-30, 5]: 
 
 
(12)     i it it VOL VOL AVOL − =  
Where: 
  AVOLit is the abnormal volume for firm i on day t; and 
i VOL is the mean daily volume of firm i  during  the  200-day  estimation  period           
[-230, -31] 
 
The observations are again segregated into three sub-samples, consisting of profit 
upgrades, profit warnings, and neutral trading statements. Abnormal volumes were averaged 
across N firms for each sub-sample, giving the average abnormal volume (AAVOL) for each 
event day: 
 





t ∑ =   
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Where: 
  AAVOLt is the average abnormal volume on day t. 
 
For the analysis of volume effects over multiple event days, the cumulative average 
abnormal volume (CAAVOL) was calculated: 
 








t w AAVOL CAAVOL  
Where: 
CAAVOLW is the cumulative average abnormal volume over an event window W days 
in length; and 
  t1 & t2 are the first and last event dates, respectively, of event window W. 
 
An estimate of the standard deviation was calculated using the 200-day estimation 
period volumes [-230, -31], which excludes the influence of any increased in variance around 
the event date: 
 









t AAVOL AAVOL AAVOL S  
Where: 
  SAAR is the standard deviation of the average abnormal volume; and 
  AAVOL is the mean average abnormal volume over the 200-day estimation period. 
 
Using the standard deviation estimate, upper-tail tests were performed to gauge the 
significance of both AARs and CAARs. All hypotheses were accepted or rejected according 
to the t-statistic, formulated as follows: 
 















One-tailed tests were applied to the AARs and CAARs for all sub-samples, given the 
a priori expectation of information leakage leading to an increase in trading volume. 
Specifically, observations were tested against a null hypothesis of AARs and CAARs being 
less than or equal to zero. 
 
3.3 Cross-Sectional Model of Firm Characteristics 
A cross-sectional model, similar to that adopted by Jackson and Madura (2003), is 
used to investigate the association between the absolute magnitude of the CARs for profit 
upgrades and warnings and the discrete firm characteristics specific to the event observation.  
The primary cross-sectional model is constructed as follows: 
 
(17)   t t NEG DBTEQU GRWTH SIZE CAR μ δ δ δ δ δ + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 0  
 
(18)   ()0 = t E μ  
Where: 
CARt is the t
th cumulative abnormal return observation; 
SIZE is the natural logarithm of the firm’s market capitalisation prior to the event 
date; 
GRWTH is the natural log return of the firm’s trading revenue between the current 
and prior periods; 
DBTEQU is the firm’s debt to equity ratio for the current period; 
NEG is a dummy variable assigned a value of one for profit warnings, and zero 
otherwise; 
δq, q = 0, …, Q, are the regression coefficients; and 
μt is the zero mean error term. 
 
The model is applied to valuation effects over one-, five-, ten-, twenty- and thirty-day 
periods prior to the announcement to determine whether the valuation effects are conditioned 
by firm size, growth, capital structure, or by the announcement’s information content. A  
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second enlarged cross-sectional model is developed, which stratifies firms making profit 
warnings into their relevant GICS industry group: 
 
(19)   t j j t IND DBTEQU GRWTH SIZE CAR μ δ δ δ δ δ + + + + + = 3 2 1 0  
 
(20)   ()0 = t E μ  
Where: 
INDj, j = 1, …, 22, is a dummy variable assigned a value of one for profit warnings 
issued by a firm in a given GICS industry group, and zero otherwise. 
 
The enlarged model is again applied to valuation effects over one-, five-, ten-, twenty- and 
thirty-day periods prior to the announcement. 
 
IV : RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.1 Information Content of Unscheduled Earnings Announcements 
The valuation and volume effects during the post-announcement period are examined 
to determine whether unscheduled earnings announcements contain private information that 
the market was previously unaware of. The study proposes that management of disclosing 
firms hold private, price sensitive information, and that unscheduled earnings announcements 
are made to fulfil obligations imposed by the ASX Listing Rules. Table 2 presents 
announcement day abnormal returns and abnormal trading volumes, as well as post-
announcement CAAR and CAAVOL for profit upgrades, downgrades and neutral trading 
statements made by ASX-listed firms during the sample period. 
Table 2, Panel A provides results for profit upgrades. On the actual announcement 
day, average abnormal returns are 5.63%, significant at the 1% level. For the five-day period 
following the announcement, a CAAR of –1.86% significant at the 1% level is observed. 
Similarly, announcement day average abnormal volume of 0.83% and a five-day CAAVOL 
of 1.00%, both significant at the 1% level, are observed. The magnitude of the post- 
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announcement abnormal return is very high and we can therefore safely conclude that the 
market has responded to new information on that day. Hence, we may also conclude, that on 
average, profit upgrade announcements contain significant information content. However, as 
also implied by Figure 1, significant negative returns following the announcement day 
indicate that the market on average overreacted to the news, resulting in a price correction 
three to four days after the information release. 
TABLE 2 - INFORMATION CONTENT OF UNSCHEDULED EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS 
This table presents the stock price and trading volume effects of unscheduled earnings announcements made by 
ASX-listed firms, over the sample period of January 1, 2004 to December 1, 2004. The event date (Day 0) is 
defined as the actual announcement release date through the ASX Company Announcements Platform. AAR 
(AAVOL) is the average abnormal return (volume) of the cross-sectionally combined observations for the 
relevant event day. CAAR (CAAVOL) is the cumulative average abnormal return (volume) over the selected 
multi-day interval. T-statistics are in parenthesis. 
 
Panel A: Profit Upgrades                   
   Event     AAR(%) or      AAVOL(%) or       
   Window     CAAR(%)       CAAVOL(%)      
  [ 0 ]    5.629%      0.828%     
    (14.685)  ***    (11.206)  ***   
 [1,  5]    -1.861%      1.004%     
    (-2.171)  ***    (6.076)  ***   
Panel B: Profit Warnings                   
   Event     AAR(%) or      AAVOL(%) or       
   Window     CAAR(%)       CAAVOL(%)      
  [ 0 ]    -4.793%      0.223%     
    (-10.711)  ***    (4.779)  ***   
 [1,  5]    -4.063%      0.881%     
    (-4.061)  ***    (8.432)  ***   
Panel C: Neutral Trading Statements                
   Event     AAR(%) or      AAVOL(%) or       
   Window     CAAR(%)       CAAVOL(%)      
  [ 0 ]    0.608%      -0.017%     
    (1.094)      -0.179     
 [1,  5]    0.007%     -0.213%     
         (0.005)        -1.024       
 
Note:       * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level 
    ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level 
  *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level 
 
Table 2, Panel B provides results for profit warnings. For the announcement day, 
average abnormal returns are -4.79%, significant at the 1% level. A CAAR of -4.06%, 
significant at the 1% level, is observed for the five-day period following the announcement. 
Further, announcement day average abnormal volume of 0.22% and a five-day CAAVOL of  
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0.88%, both significant at the 1% level, are observed. Again, a highly significant post-
announcement abnormal return permits us to conclude that the market has responded to new 
information on the announcement day. Thus, we may conclude, that on average, profit 
warning announcements contain significant information content. 
 

















































The net valuation effects of profit warnings appear to be greater in magnitude than for 
profit upgrades. While the announcement day abnormal return for profit warnings (-4.79%) is 
less than that of profit upgrades (5.63%), the market takes longer to compound information 
contained in profit warnings. As indicated by Figure 1, the average two-day valuation effect 
of profit warnings is -8.55%, also significant at the 1% level. Further, unlike profit upgrades 
there are no immediate price corrections that suggest the market initially overreacted to the 
information. 
Table 2, Panel C provides valuation and volume effects for neutral trading statements. 
On the actual announcement day, average abnormal returns are 0.61%, and a CAAR of 
0.01% is observed for the five-day period following the announcement. Neither result is 
significantly different from zero. Reported trading volume in the post-announcement period 
is also insignificant for neutral trading statements. When combined with Figure 1, we may  
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deduce that while the market response to neutral trading statements is positive, as the 
findings lack significance, the conclusion that on average neutral trading statements contain 
no information content is warranted. This finding is consistent with the definition of a neutral 
trading statement adopted, being those announcements that merely reaffirm previously stated 
projections or forecasts. Hence, the market should have already priced the information at the 
time of its original release. 
This study is consistent with Collett (2004) who finds for UK firms making 
unscheduled trading statements, that the announcement day valuation effect of negative 
announcements (-15.56%) is greater in magnitude than for positive announcements (4.19%), 
both being significant at the 1% level. However, Collet reports that the UK market tends to 
overreact to negative announcements and, on average, firms experienced a positive price 
correction in the subsequent days trading. Collett also reports similar findings of insignificant 
valuation effects following the release of neutral trading statements (0.51%). 
Helbok and Walker (2003) report that UK firms issuing profit warnings on average 
experience a -17.05% abnormal return on the announcement day. Further, Jackson and 
Madura (2003) found that US firms issuing profit warnings experience a -10.75% abnormal 
return on the announcement day. Taken together, this suggests that the Australian market is 
slower to complete its revaluation and less critical of firm’s issuing profit warnings. 
Overall, the findings are also consistent with Kim and Verrecchia (1991) who 
demonstrate that trading volume is proportional to the magnitude of the price change at the 
time of the announcement and to the degree of pre-disclosure informational asymmetry. This 
implies that, as observed, trading volume should increase at the time of unanticipated 
announcements, especially if shareholders have a diverse set of expectations. 
 
4.2 Valuation Effects of Information Leakage 
This study contends that markets are efficient in the semi-strong form. This implies 
that prices fully reflect all publicly available information, and hence that prices may be 
regarded as the consensus expectations of market participants. To the extent that information 
contained in unscheduled earnings announcements is leaked to analysts, media or major 
shareholders, the revaluation of a firm may begin before the official release of the price 
sensitive information through the Company Announcements Platform. Therefore, if firms  
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were engaging in selective disclosure prior to the official announcement release, we would 




Figure 2 demonstrates the path of the CAAR for profit upgrades during an event 
window extending thirty days before and five days after the official announcement date (Day 
0). A brief examination identifies that the abnormal returns track a slight positive trend 
before returning to a relatively constant mean reversion leading up to the announcement date. 
The substantial spike at day 0 indicates the market’s reaction immediately following the 
announcement, and the subsequent partial correction three to four days after the 
announcement. 
 
















































Table 3 presents the valuation effects around profit upgrade announcements made by 
ASX-listed firms during the sample period. Panel A reports the average abnormal return for 
the cross-sectionally combined observations for each day during the event window. None of 
the single day average abnormal returns prior to the announcement are significant. A highly  
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significant abnormal return is observed on the announcement day reflecting the release of 




TABLE 3 - VALUATION EFFECTS AROUND PROFIT UPGRADES 
This table presents the stock price effects surrounding profit upgrade announcements made by ASX-listed 
firms, over the sample period of January 1, 2004 to December 1, 2004. The event date (Day 0) is defined as the 
actual announcement release date through the ASX Company Announcements Platform. AAR is the average 
abnormal return of the cross-sectionally combined observations for the relevant event day. CAAR is the 
cumulative average abnormal return between day -30 and the relevant event day (Panel A), and over selected 
multi-day intervals (Panel B). AAR and SAAR are the mean and standard deviation of average abnormal returns. 
The t-statistics and p-values are based upon the null hypothesis that AAR (CAAR) is less than or equal to 0. 
The alternative hypothesis states that AAR (CAAR) is greater than zero. 
 
Panel A: Daily Average Abnormal Returns            
Event                Upper Tail     
Day    AAR(%)  t-statistic    p-Value    CAAR(%) 
-30     0.0654%    0.1706     0.4324     0.0654% 
-29   0.0603%  0.1573    0.4376    0.1257% 
-28   0.0734%  0.1915    0.4242    0.1991% 
-27   0.1263%  0.3295    0.3711    0.3254% 
-26   0.1835%  0.4788    0.3163    0.5089% 
-25   0.2105%  0.5493    0.2917    0.7194% 
-24   -0.1328%  -0.3465    0.6353    0.5866% 
-23   0.3267%  0.8525    0.1975    0.9134% 
-22   -0.1959%  -0.5110    0.6950    0.7175% 
-21   0.4112%  1.0728    0.1423    1.1287% 
-20   0.1088%  0.2838    0.3884    1.2375% 
-19   0.0048%  0.0125    0.4950    1.2423% 
-18   -0.0656%  -0.1711    0.5678    1.1767% 
-17   0.3093%  0.8069    0.2103    1.4860% 
-16   0.0996%  0.2600    0.3976    1.5856% 
-15   -0.2764%  -0.7211    0.7642    1.3092% 
-14   -0.2429%  -0.6337    0.7365    1.0663% 
-13   0.4692%  1.2243    0.1112    1.5356% 
-12   0.0057%  0.0149    0.4941    1.5413% 
-11   -0.4725%  -1.2328    0.8904    1.0688% 
-10   -0.1597%  -0.4167    0.6613    0.9091% 
-9   0.0858%  0.2238    0.4116    0.9949% 
-8   0.2877%  0.7507    0.2269    1.2826% 
-7   -0.3084%  -0.8048    0.7890    0.9742% 
-6   -0.3003%  -0.7835    0.7829    0.6738% 
-5   0.1383%  0.3607    0.3593    0.8121% 
-4   0.1789%  0.4668    0.3206    0.9910% 
-3   0.1230%  0.3208    0.3743    1.1140% 
-2   0.1342%  0.3500    0.3633    1.2482%  
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-1   0.3519%  0.9181    0.1798    1.6001% 
0   5.6286%  14.6852   0.0000  ***  7.2286% 
1   0.2929%  0.7643   0.2228    7.5216% 
2   -0.3076%  -0.8025   0.7884    7.2140% 
3   0.4689%  1.2233   0.1113    7.6829% 
4   -2.1136%  -5.5145   1.0000    5.5693% 
5     -0.2016%    -0.5260     0.7003     5.3677% 
AAR -0.0006%   SAAR    0.0038      
Panel B: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns over Multiple Event Days    
   Event     AAR(%) or         Upper Tail    
  Window    CAAR(%)  t-statistic    p-Value   
   [-30, -1]     1.600%    0.7622    0.2235    
 [-20,  -1]    0.471%  0.2750   0.3918   
 [-10,  -1]    0.531%  0.4383   0.3308   
 [-5,  -1]    0.926%  1.0807   0.1406   
  [ 0 ]    5.629%  14.6852    0.0000  *** 
   [1, 5]     -1.861%    -2.1714    0.9844    
 
Note:       * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level 
    ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level 
  *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level 
 
Table 3, Panel B reports CAAR for profit upgrades over select multi-day intervals. 
All CAAR leading up to the announcement date are positive, but small, and none are 
significant. These findings indicate that on average, there are no significant changes in 
market consensus expectations prior to the release of unscheduled profit upgrades by ASX-
listed firms during the sample period. 
This finding is consistent with Collett (2004) who reports that UK firms experience 
insignificant abnormal returns during a five-day window prior to the release of positive 
trading statements. Further, this study adds to the literature by examining an extended pre-
announcement window, including the analysis of numerous multi-day intervals, to improve 
the likelihood of identifying the effects of information leakage. 
 
Profit Warnings 
Figure 3 demonstrates the path of the CAAR for profit warnings during an event window 
extending thirty days before and five days after the official announcement date (Day 0). An 
initial assessment suggests that the abnormal returns for profit warnings track a more 
substantial negative drift leading up to the announcement, before a brief correction prior to  
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the announcement date. The downward spike from day 0 indicates a two-day revaluation 
period as the market adjusts to the new information. There does not appear to be evidence of 
an immediate positive correction to counter an initial overreaction by the market.   
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Table 4 presents the valuation effects around profit warnings made by ASX-listed 
firms during the sample period. Panel A reports the average abnormal return for the cross-
sectionally combined observations for each day during the event window whereas Panel B 
reports CAAR for profit warnings over select multi-day intervals. 
Unlike profit upgrades, the study finds some evidence of abnormal returns during the 
thirty-day pre-announcement period. Firstly, we observe CAARs of -5.66% for the window           
[-30, -1] and -4.22% for the window [-20, -1], both significant at the 5% level. Observed 
CAARs for the windows [-10, -1] and [-5, -1] are also negative, but are insignificant. 
Furthermore, an inspection of individual daily average abnormal returns identifies, among 
other significant results, a cluster of days with significant negative valuation changes 
between one and two-weeks prior to the announcement date. Specifically, we observe 
average abnormal return of -1.10%, significant at the 1% level, for event day [-7], and 
average abnormal return of -0.90%, significant at the 5% level, for event day [-5]. We also 
observe returns of -0.63% and -0.61% for event days [-9] and [-8] respectively, both 




TABLE 4 - VALUATION EFFECTS AROUND PROFIT WARNINGS 
This table presents the stock price effects surrounding profit warnings made by ASX-listed firms, over the 
sample period of January 1, 2004 to December 1, 2004. The event date (Day 0) is defined as the actual 
announcement release date through the ASX Company Announcements Platform. AAR is the average abnormal 
return of the cross-sectionally combined observations for the relevant event day. CAAR is the cumulative 
average abnormal return between day -30 and the relevant event day (Panel A), and over selected multi-day 
intervals (Panel B). AAR and SAAR are the mean and standard deviation of average abnormal returns. The t-
statistics and p-values are based upon the null hypothesis that AAR (CAAR) is greater than or equal to 0. The 
alternative hypothesis states that AAR (CAAR) is less than zero. 
 
Panel A: Daily Average Abnormal Returns           
Event               Lower Tail      
Day    AAR(%)  t-statistic    p-Value    CAAR(%) 
-30     0.1763%    0.3939     0.6530     0.1763% 
-29   -0.1005%  -0.2246    0.4113    0.0758% 
-28   -0.1066%  -0.2383    0.4060    -0.0308% 
-27   -0.1134%  -0.2535    0.4001    -0.1443% 
-26   0.0770%  0.1722    0.5683    -0.0672% 
-25   -0.9632%  -2.1526    0.0163  **  -1.0304% 
-24   -0.4041%  -0.9031    0.1838    -1.4345% 
-23   -0.4667%  -1.0429    0.1491    -1.9012% 
-22   1.1190%  2.5008    0.9934    -0.7822% 
-21   -0.6604%  -1.4759    0.0708  *  -1.4426% 
-20   0.2828%  0.6320    0.7359    -1.1598% 
-19   -0.4973%  -1.1115    0.1338    -1.6571% 
-18   -0.0115%  -0.0258    0.4897    -1.6687% 
-17   -0.3251%  -0.7264    0.2342    -1.9937% 
-16   -0.2540%  -0.5677    0.2854    -2.2477% 
-15   -0.0922%  -0.2061    0.4185    -2.3400% 
-14   -0.4393%  -0.9819    0.1637    -2.7793% 
-13   -0.4055%  -0.9062    0.1830    -3.1848% 
-12   -0.2070%  -0.4626    0.3221    -3.3918% 
-11   -0.4537%  -1.0140    0.1559    -3.8455% 
-10   0.8282%  1.8508    0.9672    -3.0173% 
-9   -0.6284%  -1.4044    0.0809  *  -3.6458% 
-8   -0.6041%  -1.3501    0.0893  *  -4.2499% 
-7   -1.1029%  -2.4649    0.0073  ***  -5.3528% 
-6   0.1300%  0.2905    0.6141    -5.2228% 
-5   -0.8984%  -2.0078    0.0230  **  -6.1212% 
-4   0.1010%  0.2258    0.5892    -6.0202% 
-3   0.2973%  0.6645    0.7464    -5.7228% 
-2   0.4727%  1.0565    0.8540    -5.2501% 
-1   -0.4113%  -0.9192    0.1796    -5.6614% 
0   -4.7929%  -10.7114  0.0000  ***  -10.4543%
1   -3.7548%  -8.3915   0.0000  ***  -14.2092%
2   -0.2892%  -0.6463   0.2594    -14.4983%
3   0.1728%  0.3862   0.6501    -14.3256%
4   0.1955%  0.4368   0.6687    -14.1301%
5     -0.3872%    -0.8653     0.1939     -14.5173%
AAR -0.0077%   SAAR  0.0045        
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Panel B: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns over Multiple Event Days    
   Event     AAR(%) or         Lower Tail    
  Window    CAAR(%)  t-statistic    p-Value   
   [-30, -1]     -5.661%    -2.3100    0.0110  ** 
 [-20,  -1]    -4.219%  -2.1083   0.0182  ** 
 [-10,  -1]    -1.816%  -1.2833   0.1005   
 [-5,  -1]    -0.439%  -0.4384    0.3308   
  [ 0 ]    -4.793%  -10.7114    0.0000  *** 
   [1, 5]     -4.063%    -4.0608    0.0000  *** 
 
Note:       * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level 
    ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level 
  *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level 
 
Taken together, these results suggest there is significant informed trading activity, 
causing substantial valuation effects, prior to the release of profit warnings by ASX-listed 
firms during the sample period. These findings are unanticipated in light of the continuous 
disclosure obligations imposed on ASX-listed firms, and with reference to recent studies 
surrounding similar provisions in the United Kingdom and the United States of America. 
Jackson and Madura (2003) report a highly significant CAAR of -3.53% for the 
window [-10, -2] preceding the release of profit warnings by US firms, their study was 
conducted prior to the introduction of legislative provisions prohibiting selective disclosure 
in the USA. While Mac (2002) reports an abatement of unfair trading in the USA subsequent 
to the introduction of Regulation FD, his study included both periodic and unscheduled 
earnings announcements thus jettisoning direct comparison to the findings of this study. 
Conversely, Helbok and Walker (2003) examined the effects of changes to the 
London Stock Exchange Guidance Notes in 1994 and the imposition of a continuous 
disclosure obligation similar to that enacted in Australia. They report significant average 
abnormal returns during the two days immediately prior to the release of profit warnings for 
the pre-enactment period, but find informed trading and average abnormal returns are 
reduced to insignificant levels in the post-enactment period. The findings of Helbok and 
Walker are corroborated by Collet (2004) who reports no evidence of information leakage or 
significant average abnormal returns during the window [-5, -1] for UK firms making 
negative trading statements in the period 1995-2001.  
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Neutral Trading Statements 
Following from the results reported in Table 2 and subsequent discussion figures and 
tables of results are not reported for neutral trading statements. The results can be 
summarised as follows: Most observations are highly insignificant, with the exception of 
event day [-1], which exhibits an average abnormal return of 0.93%, marginally significant at 
the 10% level. Notably, average abnormal returns observed on the announcement date and 
thereafter are conclusively insignificant. This study also finds that CAAR leading up to the 
announcement date vary in directional signal and are all decidedly insignificant. When 
considered with previous stated findings regarding the information content of neutral trading 
statements, it is difficult to conceive that valuation effects witnessed are the result of 
information leakage and informed trading. If neutral trading statements do not contain any 
information content that the market was previously unaware, then realistically management 
does not hold private information with which an informed trader could benefit in the pre-
announcement period. 
 
4.3 Volume Effects of Information Leakage 
This study contends that markets are efficient in the semi-strong form, which entails 
that prices fully reflect all publicly available information. While valuation effects are 
examined to identify changes in the market’s consensus expectations, irregular trading 
volume may reflect heterogeneous expectations of individual investors (Bamber, 1986, 
Collett, 2004). To the extent that information is leaked to individuals, a firm may experience 
abnormal levels of trading volume before the official release of the price sensitive 
information via the Company Announcements Platform. Therefore, if firms were engaging in 
selective disclosure prior to the official announcement release, we would expect to see a 
positive increase in trading volumes as informed traders revise their positions. 
Profit Upgrades 
Figure 4 presents daily average abnormal volume during an event window extending 
thirty days before and five days after the official announcement date (Day 0). The substantial 
increase in volume subsequent to the announcement is consistent with the market reaction to  
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new information contained in profit upgrades. Prior to the announcement, daily trading 
volumes are generally below average volume levels observed during the estimation period. 
 








































Table 5 presents the volume effects around profit upgrades made by ASX-listed firms 
during the sample period. Panel A reports the average abnormal volume for the cross-
sectionally combined observations for each day during the event window, whereas Panel B 
reports CAAVOL for profit warnings over select multi-day intervals. None of the single day 
abnormal volumes before the announcement are significant, and most observations are in fact 
below the adopted benchmark. Highly significant abnormal volume observed following the 
announcement is consistent with Kim and Verrecchia (1991), demonstrating that abnormal 
trading volumes are  proportional to the degree of price change at the time of an 
unanticipated announcement.  
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TABLE 5 - VOLUME EFFECTS AROUND PROFIT UPGRADES 
This table presents the trading volume effects surrounding profit upgrade announcements made by ASX-listed 
firms, over the sample period of January 1, 2004 to December 1, 2004. The event date (Day 0) is defined as the 
actual announcement release date through the ASX Company Announcements Platform. AAVOL is the average 
abnormal volume of the cross-sectionally combined observations for the relevant event day. CAAVOL is the 
cumulative average abnormal volume between day -30 and the relevant event day (Panel A), and over selected 
multi-day intervals (Panel B). AAVOL and SAAVOL are the mean and standard deviation of average abnormal 
volumes. The t-statistics and p-values are based upon the null hypothesis that AAVOL (CAAVOL) is less than 
or equal to 0. The alternative hypothesis states that AAVOL (CAAVOL) is greater than zero.  
 
Panel A: Daily Average Abnormal Volume           
Event                Upper Tail     
Day    AAVOL(%)  t-statistic    p-Value    CAAVOL(%) 
-30     -0.1020%    -1.3804     0.9155     -0.1020% 
-29   -0.0914%  -1.2371    0.8912    -0.1935% 
-28   -0.0719%  -0.9734    0.8342    -0.2654% 
-27   -0.0877%  -1.1862    0.8815    -0.3531% 
-26   -0.0654%  -0.8854    0.8115    -0.4185% 
-25   -0.0316%  -0.4277    0.6653    -0.4501% 
-24   -0.0212%  -0.2872    0.6129    -0.4714% 
-23   -0.0592%  -0.8004    0.7878    -0.5305% 
-22   -0.0593%  -0.8029    0.7885    -0.5899% 
-21   -0.0955%  -1.2917    0.9010    -0.6854% 
-20   -0.0880%  -1.1905    0.8824    -0.7734% 
-19   -0.0567%  -0.7666    0.7779    -0.8300% 
-18   -0.0191%  -0.2583    0.6018    -0.8491% 
-17   0.0612%  0.8282    0.2043    -0.7879% 
-16   0.0134%  0.1820    0.4279    -0.7744% 
-15   -0.0099%  -0.1338    0.5532    -0.7843% 
-14   0.0157%  0.2129    0.4158    -0.7686% 
-13   -0.0398%  -0.5380    0.7044    -0.8084% 
-12   -0.0829%  -1.1222    0.8684    -0.8913% 
-11   -0.0754%  -1.0200    0.8455    -0.9667% 
-10   0.0141%  0.1906    0.4245    -0.9526% 
-9   -0.0480%  -0.6492   0.7415    -1.0006% 
-8   0.0004%  0.0055   0.4978    -1.0002% 
-7   -0.0361%  -0.4882   0.6870    -1.0363% 
-6   -0.0186%  -0.2512   0.5991    -1.0549% 
-5   0.0205%  0.2771   0.3910    -1.0344% 
-4   -0.0405%  -0.5484   0.7080    -1.0749% 
-3   -0.0565%  -0.7644   0.7772    -1.1314% 
-2   -0.0380%  -0.5136   0.6960    -1.1694% 
-1   -0.0636%  -0.8611   0.8049    -1.2330% 
0   0.8283%  11.2059    0.0000  ***  -0.4047% 
1   0.7612%  10.2983    0.0000  ***  0.3565% 
2   0.1685%  2.2797    0.0118  **  0.5250% 
3   0.0848%  1.1476    0.1263    0.6098% 
4   0.0463%  0.6263    0.2659    0.6561% 
5     -0.0566%    -0.7664     0.7778     0.5994% 
AAVOL 0.2442%   SAAVOL 0.0007        
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Panel B: Cumulative Average Abnormal Volume over Multiple Event Days    
   Event     AAVOL(%) or         Upper Tail    
  Window    CAAVOL(%)  t-statistic    p-Value   
   [-30, -1]     -1.233%    -3.0456    0.9987    
 [-20,  -1]    -0.548%  -1.6568   0.9503   
 [-10,  -1]    -0.266%  -1.1393   0.8720   
 [-5,  -1]    -0.178%  -1.0780    0.8588   
  [ 0 ]    0.828%  11.2059    0.0000  *** 
   [1, 5]     1.004%    6.0756    0.0000  *** 
 
Note:       * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level 
    ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level 
  *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level 
 
Panel B observes that all CAAVOL prior to the announcement of profit upgrades are, 
on average, negative and highly insignificant. Taken with the results expressed in Panel A, 
these findings indicate that there is no systematic evidence of individuals engaging in 
informed trading prior to the release of unscheduled profit upgrades by ASX-listed firms 
during the sample period. 
This finding is consistent with Collett (2004) who reports that UK firms experience 
insignificant abnormal volumes for each of the five days prior to the release of positive 
trading statements. Further, this study adds to the literature by examining an extended pre-
announcement window, including the analysis of numerous multi-day intervals, to assist in 
identifying information leakage occurring before five days prior to announcements. 
 
Profit Warnings 
Figure 5 portrays daily average abnormal volume during an event window extending 
thirty days before and five days after the official announcement date (Day 0). The substantial 
increase in volume subsequent to the announcement is consistent with the market reaction to 
new information contained in profit warnings. Abnormal trading volumes for the two days 
following the release of a profit warning (0.22% and 0.49% respectively) are considerably 
smaller than those observed for profit upgrades for the same period (0.83% and 0.76% 
respectively), again suggesting the market reacts to negative announcements with increased 
caution in comparison to positive announcements. Prior to the announcement, daily trading 
volumes are sporadic, though largely mean reverting, with strong evidence of increased 
trading levels for several days during the period.  
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Table 6 presents the volume effects around profit warnings made by ASX-listed firms 
during the sample period. Panel A reports the average abnormal volume for the cross-
sectionally combined observations for each day during the event window. Consistent with 
Figure 6, we observe evidence of significant abnormal trading volume during the thirty-day 
pre-announcement period.  
Average abnormal volume of 0.06%, significant at the 10% level, observed for day [-
5] supports the previously reported average abnormal returns observed for the same day. 
Together these findings provide conclusive evidence of irregular trading activity around the 
period one to two weeks prior to official announcement release. Further, abnormal volumes 
of -0.10% and -0.08% are observed for event days [-15] and [-16] respectively, both 
significant at the 5% level. These event days, however, do not experience proportional 
abnormal revenues for the given sample. It is thereby proposed that witnessing isolated 
abnormal volumes, which do not occur concurrently with significant valuation effects, 





TABLE 6 - VOLUME EFFECTS AROUND PROFIT WARNINGS 
This table presents the trading volume effects surrounding profit warnings  made by ASX-listed firms, over the 
sample period of January 1, 2004 to December 1, 2004. The event date (Day 0) is defined as the actual 
announcement release date through the ASX Company Announcements Platform. AAVOL is the average 
abnormal volume of the cross-sectionally combined observations for the relevant event day. CAAVOL is the 
cumulative average abnormal volume between day -30 and the relevant event day (Panel A), and over selected 
multi-day intervals (Panel B). AAVOL and SAAVOL are the mean and standard deviation of average abnormal 
volumes. The t-statistics and p-values are based upon the null hypothesis that AAVOL (CAAVOL) is less than 
or equal to 0. The alternative hypothesis states that AAVOL (CAAVOL) is greater than zero.  
 
Panel A: Daily Average Abnormal Volume           
Event                Upper Tail     
Day    AAVOL(%)  t-statistic    p-Value    CAAVOL(%) 
-30     -0.0103%    -0.2210     0.5873     -0.0103% 
-29   0.0158%  0.3380    0.3678    0.0055% 
-28   -0.0180%  -0.3844    0.6495    -0.0125% 
-27   -0.0106%  -0.2259    0.5893    -0.0231% 
-26   -0.0049%  -0.1050    0.5418    -0.0280% 
-25   0.0482%  1.0317    0.1517    0.0203% 
-24   0.0333%  0.7118    0.2387    0.0535% 
-23   0.0029%  0.0625    0.4751    0.0564% 
-22   -0.0175%  -0.3747    0.6459    0.0389% 
-21   -0.0021%  -0.0447    0.5178    0.0368% 
-20   0.0262%  0.5612    0.2876    0.0631% 
-19   0.0054%  0.1148    0.4544    0.0684% 
-18   -0.0339%  -0.7259    0.7656    0.0345% 
-17   0.0140%  0.2987    0.3827    0.0485% 
-16   0.0838%  1.7924    0.0373  **  0.1322% 
-15   0.1005%  2.1512    0.0163  **  0.2328% 
-14   0.0007%  0.0147    0.4941    0.2334% 
-13   0.0064%  0.1375    0.4454    0.2399% 
-12   -0.0049%  -0.1058    0.5421    0.2349% 
-11   0.0165%  0.3531    0.3622    0.2514% 
-10   0.0425%  0.9092    0.1822    0.2939% 
-9   0.0139%  0.2968    0.3835    0.3078% 
-8   -0.0016%  -0.0337    0.5134    0.3062% 
-7   -0.0067%  -0.1442    0.5573    0.2995% 
-6   -0.0321%  -0.6863    0.7533    0.2674% 
-5   0.0655%  1.4020    0.0812  *  0.3329% 
-4   0.0004%  0.0081    0.4968    0.3333% 
-3   0.0246%  0.5268    0.2995    0.3579% 
-2   0.0005%  0.0103    0.4959    0.3584% 
-1   0.0466%  0.9972    0.1599    0.4050% 
0   0.2233%  4.7791    0.0000  ***  0.6283% 
1   0.4891%  10.4671    0.0000  ***  1.1175% 
2   0.1466%  3.1376    0.0010  ***  1.2641% 
3   0.1486%  3.1789    0.0009  ***  1.4127% 
4   0.0762%  1.6299    0.0524  *  1.4888% 
5     0.0206%    0.4402     0.3301     1.5094% 
AAVOL 0.1312%   SAAVOL  0.0005        
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Panel B: Cumulative Average Abnormal Volume over Multiple Event Days    
   Event     AAVOL(%) or         Upper Tail    
  Window    CAAVOL(%)  t-statistic    p-Value   
   [-30, -1]     0.405%    1.5823    0.0577  * 
 [-20,  -1]    0.368%  1.7616   0.0399  ** 
 [-10,  -1]    0.154%  1.0392   0.1500   
 [-5,  -1]    0.138%  1.3168   0.0947  * 
  [ 0 ]    0.223%  4.7791    0.0000  *** 
   [1, 5]     0.881%    8.4316    0.0000  *** 
 
Note:       * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level 
    ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level 
  *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level 
 
Table 6, Panel B reports CAAVOL for profit warnings over select multi-day 
intervals. The findings generally support those expressed for single day observations prior to 
the announcement day. All CAAVOL are positive, and most are significant. Specifically, 
CAAVOL of 0.37% for the event window [-20, -1] supports the proposition of substantial 
irregular trading activity during the three-week period leading up the release of profit 
warnings by ASX-listed firms during the sample period. These findings are generally 
inconsistent with Collett (2004) who also examines trading volume prior to the release of 
negative trading statements by UK firms. Collett reports no evidence of significant abnormal 
trading volume for the five-day period prior to announcement. 
 
Neutral Trading Statements 
Previously stated findings of this study indicated that neutral trading statements on 
average contained no new information that the market was previously unaware of. This 
finding was consistent with the sub-sample constraint that neutral trading statements merely 
reaffirmed prior forecasts or projections to resolve heterogeneous expectations or incorrect 
market projections, rather than reveal new private information. Accordingly, the study 
anticipated insignificant trading volume and returns during the event window surrounding 
neutral trading statements.  
A brief examination suggests increased trading activity early in the event window, 
which reverts to a period of consistent sub-normal trading levels leading up to the 
announcements date. Insignificant (negative) abnormal volume following day 0 indicates 
there was no increase in trading activity subsequent the announcement release. CAAVOL for  
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all windows during the study period are negative and highly insignificant when testing for 
abnormally high trading activity. 
These findings are difficult, but considered broadly may allude to the marginal 
motivations of management to issue a neutral trading statement to the market which, as 
previously defined, does no more than to merely reaffirm previously stated forecasts or 
projections. It is hereby posited that management of firms issuing neutral trading statements, 
while not holding private information, are generally responding to uncertainty or doubt 
surrounding their current or future performance. Such uncertainty may indeed be the result of 
media or market rumours, and hence management provides additional voluntary disclosure to 




4.4 Firm Characteristics 
The initial findings of this study, as reported above, indicate there is sufficient 
evidence of information leakage and informed trading prior to unscheduled earnings 
announcements by ASX-listed firms to merit further analysis. The ensuing discussion 
presents the findings of this study’s attempt to identify the variables, or firm characteristics, 
which influence firm disclosure practices and contribute to levels of information asymmetry 
during the pre-announcement period. Given the potential legal and reputation costs of 
breaching disclosure rules, it is proposed that unobservable motivations induce management 
to engage in selective disclosure. Prior studies have investigated the influence of firm size 
and information content in contributing to information leakage. As previously stated, this 
study extends the current literature by considering the additional variables of firm growth, 
capital structure and industry group.  
The methodology used to is similar to that adopted by Jackson and Madura (2003) in 
their study of profit warnings issued by US firms. The cross-sectional OLS model tests 
                                                 
6 For example, the following extract is taken from a neutral trading statement issued by Flight Centre Ltd (FLT) 
on June 30, 2004: 
‘In light of recent press speculation at an important point in the current financial year, Flight Centre Ltd 
wishes to confirm its position on changes in industry commission arrangements and the likely year-end 
profit outcomes. … The company also reaffirms its profit expectations for 2003-04, in response to 
unattributed press speculation.’  
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whether the absolute magnitude of CARs for profit upgrades and warnings, observed over 
five event windows, can be attributed to a set of exogenous variables. The final sample 
consists of 179 observations for each event window.
7 Table 7 summarises the independent 
variable descriptive statistics (Panel A) and independent variable correlation (Panel B). Panel 
B indicates that the independent variables exhibit weak correlation, and may be modelled in 
their original formulation without a need to correct for collinearity. 
 
TABLE 7 - INDEPENDENT VARIABLES STATISTICS 
This table presents the independent variables descriptive statistics (Panel A) and correlation (Panel B). The 
independent variables are: SIZE - natural log of firm market capitalisation, GRWTH - natural log return of firm 
trading revenue, and DBTEQU - debt to equity ratio of firm. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics                
      SIZE     GRWTH     DBTEQU    
           
Minimum    0.47   -3.0330   -9.53   
Maximum   10.75    6.9925    11.69   
Range   10.28    10.0255    21.22   
            
Mean   4.70    0.3174    0.53   
Median   4.45    0.1563    0.30   
Standard Deviation    1.920   1.053  1.521   
           
Panel B: Correlation                   
                       
SIZE    1   0.080  0.132   
GRTH   0.080    1    -0.013   
DBTEQU    0.132   -0.013   1   
                       
 
 
Table 8 presents the results for the primary OLS model, which includes the three 
independent variables representing firm size, growth and capital structure, and a dummy 
variable assigned a value of one for profit warnings, and zero otherwise. The dummy variable 
is used to stratify positive and negative unscheduled earnings announcement to determine 
whether a firm’s propensity to pre-disclose price sensitive information is conditional upon 
the information content of the announcement. 
 
 
                                                 
7 Neutral trading statements are removed from the final sample as prior results indicated that on average they 
did not contain significant information content. Hence, valuation effects observed prior to the announcement 
day could not be attributed to information leakage, but rather other extraneous factors surrounding the event.  
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TABLE 8 - RESULTS OF CROSS SECTIONAL ANALYSIS FOR UPGRADES AND WARNINGS 
This table presents the regression tests of information content prior to profit adjustments (upgrades/downgrades) 
made by ASX-listed firms, over the sample period of January 1, 2004 to December 1, 2004. The dependant 
variable is the absolute CAR for each event window. The independent variables are: SIZE - natural log of firm 
market capitalisation, GRWTH - natural log return of firm trading revenue, DBTEQU - debt to equity ratio of 
firm, and NEG - dummy variable assigned a value of one for profit warnings and zero otherwise. T-statistics are 
in parentheses. 
 
t t NEG DBTEQU GRWTH SIZE CAR μ δ δ δ δ δ + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 0  
 
               Event Window             
      [-1]     [-5, -1]     [-10, -1]     [-20, -1]     [-30, -1]    
                  
C    0.0095   0.0124    0.0138    0.0283   0.0548 
   (1.214)    (0.942)   (0.678)   (0.896)    (1.318) 
SIZE    -0.0007   0.0001    0.0001    -0.0023   -0.0054 
   (-0.575)    (0.062)   (0.036)   (-0.404)    (-0.732)  
GRWTH    -0.0018   -0.0036    -0.0125    -0.0171   -0.0212 
   (-0.945)    (-0.868)   (-1.979) **  (-1.736)  *  (-1.637)   
DBTEQU    -0.0026   -0.0042    -0.0075    -0.0093   -0.0054 
   (-1.889)  *  (-1.472)   (-1.696) * (-1.358)    (-0.596)   
NEG   -0.0011    -0.0062   0.0098    0.0308    0.0311 
   (-0.173)    (-0.667)    (0.688)   (1.393)    (1.068) 
                    
R
2    0.017   0.018    0.042    0.031   0.033   
 
Note:       * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level 
    ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level 
  *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level 
 
The R squareds indicate that the primary model explains between 1.7% and 4.2% of 
the variation in absolute magnitude of CARs observed over the five event windows prior to 
the announcement day. A brief examination of the results from the primary model indicates 
the relationship between a firm’s market capitalisation (SIZE) and the magnitude of CARs is 
inconsistent across the five event windows, and insignificant. Both the rate of growth in 
trading volume (GRWTH), and the level of debt financing employed by a firm (DBTEQU) 
appear to have a consistent inverse relationship with the magnitude of CAR, with initial 
evidence suggesting that the relationship may be significant during several event windows. 
Finally, the dummy variable assigned to profit warnings (NEG) suggests an inconsistent 
relationship, which may indicate that a propensity to pre-disclose negative price sensitive 
information decreases closer to the announcement date. 
Overall, the primary model has minimal explanatory power for the magnitude of 
CARs observed during the pre-announcement period for profit upgrades and warnings. A 
second model is constructed which substitutes the dummy variable for profit warnings (NEG)  
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with a series of dummy variables that each represent profit warnings made by ASX-listed 
firms during the sample period according to the firm’s industry group (INDj). 
Table 9 presents the results of the enlarged OLS model that again includes the three 
dependent variables representing firm size, growth and capital structure, and a series of 
dummy variables assigned a value of one for profit warnings issued by firms in a given GICS 
industry group, and zero otherwise. The dummy variable is used to determine whether a 
firm’s propensity to pre-disclose negative price sensitive information is conditional upon 
their industry group. 
 
TABLE 9 - RESULTS OF CROSS SECTIONAL ANALYSIS BY INDUSTRY 
This table presents the regression tests of information content prior to profit adjustments (upgrades/downgrades) 
made by ASX-listed firms, over the sample period of January 1, 2004 to December 1, 2004. The dependant 
variable is the absolute CAR for each event window. The independent variables are: SIZE - natural log of firm 
market capitalisation, GRWTH - natural log return of firm trading revenue, DBTEQU - debt to equity ratio of 
firm, and IND – dummy variable assigned a value of one for profit warnings issued by firms in a given GICS 
industry group and zero otherwise. T-statistics are in parentheses. 
 
t j j t IND DBTEQU GRWTH SIZE CAR μ δ δ δ δ δ + + + + + = 3 2 1 0  
 
               Event Window             
      [-1]     [-5, -1]     [-10, -1]     [-20, -1]     [-30, -1]    
                  
C    0.0082   0.0068   0.0065    0.0202   0.0486  
   (0.990)    (0.473)    (0.297)    (0.567)   (1.039)  
SIZE    -0.0007   0.0011   0.0016    -0.0005   -0.0044  
   (-0.440)    (0.403)    (0.398)    (-0.079)   (-0.515)  
GRWTH    0.0000   -0.0035   -0.0121    -0.0178   -0.0240  
   (-0.011)    (-0.865)    (-1.960)  *  (-1.783) *  (-1.826) * 
DBTEQU    -0.0020   -0.0028   -0.0081    -0.0104   -0.0026  
   (-1.178)    (-0.933)    (-1.779)  *  (-1.410)   (-0.264)  
IND:                    
1510    0.0043   -0.0097   -0.0035   -0.0235   -0.0094  
   (0.447)    (-0.574)    (-0.136)   (-0.562)   (-0.171)  
2010    -0.0134   -0.0176   -0.0037   0.0204   -0.0818  
   (-0.965)    (-0.727)    (-0.100)   (0.340)   (-1.038)  
2020    -0.0150   -0.0153   -0.0071   0.0761   0.1538  
   (-1.018)    (-0.598)    (-0.183)   (1.205)   (1.852) ** 
2030    -0.0132   -0.0089   0.0403   0.0598   0.0160  
   (-0.795)    (-0.306)    (0.913)   (0.836)   (0.170)  
2510    -0.0060   0.0038   0.0171   -0.0382   -0.0845  
   (-0.263)    (0.096)    (0.283)   (-0.390)   (-0.656)  
2520    0.0293   0.0140   -0.0200   0.0120   0.0493  
   (1.543)  *  (0.424)    (-0.397)   (0.148)   (0.460)  
2530    -0.0256   -0.0786   -0.0451   -0.0311   -0.0787  
   (-1.542)    (-2.720)    (-1.026)   (-0.436)   (-0.840)  
2540    -0.0288   0.0178   0.0193   0.0784   0.1309   
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   (-1.260)    (0.446)    (0.319)   (0.799)   (1.013)  
2550    0.0486   -0.0262   0.0023   0.0285   0.0766  
   (2.576)  ***  (-0.798)    (0.046)   (0.351)   (0.719)  
3020    -0.0210   -0.0210   -0.0033   0.0411   0.0309  
   (-1.885)    (-1.082)    (-0.113)   (0.860)   (0.491)  
3510    0.0467   0.0307   0.1249   0.2221   0.1756  
   (2.488)  ***  (0.938)    (2.512) ***  (2.754) ***  (1.655) ** 
4010    -0.0023   -0.0262   -0.0230   0.0034   -0.0130  
   (-0.094)    (-0.619)    (-0.357)   (0.033)   (-0.094)  
4020    0.0049   0.0445   -0.0237   -0.0299   0.0853  
   (0.199)    (1.038)    (-0.364)   (-0.282)   (0.613)  
4040    -0.0413   -0.0376   -0.2859   -0.2759   -0.2330  
   (-1.283)    (-0.669)    (-3.348)   (-1.992)   (-1.278)  
4510    -0.0368   0.0174   0.0484   0.0820   0.1894  
   (-2.439)    (0.664)    (1.212)   (1.266)   (2.222) ** 
4520    0.1054   0.1209   0.1188   0.0732   -0.0544  
   (5.556)  ***  (3.656)  ***  (2.363) ***  (0.898)   (-0.507)  
5010    -0.0079   -0.0152   0.2008   0.1796   0.1471  
   (-0.244)    (-0.269)    (2.341) ***  (1.291) *  (0.804)  
5510    0.0095   -0.0197   0.1026   0.1509   0.1909  
   (0.296)    (-0.351)    (1.206)   (1.093)   (1.051)  
                  
R
2    0.313     0.170     0.212     0.146     0.134   
 
Note:       * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level 
    ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level 
  *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level 
 
The R squareds indicate that the enlarged model explains between 13.4% and 31.3% 
of the variation in absolute magnitude of CARs observed over the five event windows prior 
to the announcement day. This represents a considerable improvement of between 10.1% and 
29.6% when compared with the parallel results obtained using the primary model. 
The coefficients for SIZE vary in signal between windows and are close to zero. All 
coefficients for SIZE are insignificant. These findings are relatively consistent with Jackson 
and Madura (2003) who, although finding a significant positive relationship between firm-
size and the magnitude of CARs one-day prior to announcement, found the relationship was 
inconsistent and not significant for extended windows prior to the release of profit warnings 
by US firms. The results of this study may be partially explained by limitations incidental to 
the data set. The sample mainly consists of smaller companies and therefore may lose some 
of the variation in information leakage associated with firm size 
The independent variable firm growth (GRWTH), defined by this study as a firm’s 
increase in trading revenue, is previously untested in the supporting literature. Table 9  
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indicates that GRWTH has an inverse relationship with the dependent variable CAR across 
all event windows studied. Further, the coefficients for event windows [-10, -1], [-20, -1] and 
[-30, -1] are all marginally significant at the 10% confidence level. This relationship suggests 
that firm’s experiencing growth in trading activities are less likely to incur significant 
valuation effects prior to the announcement date. Arguably, this relationship may be 
attributed to the fact that firms experiencing trading revenue growth are less likely to make 
profit warnings, and above this study reports no significant evidence of abnormal trading 
activity for profit upgrades made by ASX-listed firms during 2004. 
An inverse relationship between a firm’s capital structure (DBTEQU), as indicated by 
its debt to equity ratio, and the magnitude of pre-announcement CAR are observed for all 
event windows studied. Further, the coefficient for DBTEQU is significant at the 10% 
confidence level for the event window [-10, -1], which corresponds with a period of 
significant abnormal trading activity prior to profit warnings issued by ASX-listed firms. 
While this variable has not been considered in the supporting literature, this relationship 
would indicate that firms with increasing levels of debt finance in relation to equity, have 
decreasing propensity to pre-disclose price sensitive information prior to the official 
announcement release. This finding is especially noteworthy when considering firms issuing 
profit warnings, as a profit warning would generally indicate decreased revenue and a 
parallel reduced ability to service debt requirements.  
Finally, a firm’s propensity to pre-disclose information contained in profit warnings, 
as segmented by industry group, is considered. The results of the primary model were 
inconsistent with this study’s previously reported findings, which suggested significant 
information leakage and informed trading activity prior to the release of profit warnings by 
ASX-listed firms. As the primary model indicated this relationship was not significant across 
all event windows, the extended model stratifies firms by their GICS industry group to 
enhance our ability observe associations that are more marginal. 
As indicated in Table 9, seven of the eighteen industries represented in the sample 
exhibit significant coefficients for at least one event window observed. The most substantial 
findings were for Health Care Equipment & Services (IND 3510), which reported highly 
significant coefficients for all windows except [-5, -1], and Technology Hardware & 
Equipment (IND 4520), which reported highly significant coefficients for window [-10, -1]  
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and shorter time-periods. Other industries exhibiting significant coefficients were 
Commercial Services & Supplies (IND 2020), Consumer Durables and Apparel (IND 2520), 
Retailing (IND 2550), Software & Services (IND 4510) and Telecommunication Services 
(IND 5010). In contrast, the model constant term (C), which illustrates the intercept term for 
positive announcements, is highly insignificant across all event windows. This finding 
indicates that firms within particular industry groups have an apparent increased propensity 
to pre-disclose information contained in profit warnings prior to the official information 
release via the Company Announcements Platform. 
 
V : CONCLUSION 
 
This paper presents an empirical study of information content and trading behaviour 
around unscheduled earnings announcements – consisting of profit upgrades, profit warnings 
and neutral trading statements – made by ASX-listed companies during 2004. The contention 
is that informed trading impacts on the stock returns and trading volumes of listed entities, 
and hence abnormal returns or trading volumes observed prior to an announcement provide 
evidence of information leakage.  
The signal conveyed in profit adjustments may be uncertain where the market has 
anticipated the information from other news disseminated about a firm, an industry, or the 
general economy (Jackson and Madura, 2003). The valuation and volume effects during the 
post-announcement period are examined to determine whether management of disclosing 
firms hold private, price sensitive information, which the market was previously unaware. In 
an efficient market, a positive (negative) abnormal return on the announcement day implies 
that the market reacted to unanticipated good (bad) news that day (Mac, 2002).  We observe 
highly significant levels of average abnormal revenue and proportional abnormal trading 
volume for both profit upgrades and profit warnings on the announcement day. Accordingly, 
we can confidently reject the null hypothesis of nil information content for profit upgrades 
and profit warnings. Further, we may conclude that these announcements contain private 
information, and are made to fulfil obligations imposed by the ASX Listing Rules.  
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These findings do not hold for neutral trading statements. We report that average 
abnormal revenue and trading volume on the announcement day of neutral trading statements 
were not significantly different from zero, and are unable to reject the null hypotheses of nil 
information content. It is posited that managers of firms making neutral trading statements do 
so to improve transparency and marketability, and further to prevent a false market in their 
securities. 
The study then examines the pre-announcement period to test for information 
asymmetry and informed trading prior to the official release of the earnings information 
through the ASX Company Announcements Platform. To the extent that information is 
leaked to the media, analysts or favoured shareholders, the market’s revaluation of a firm 
may begin before the unscheduled earnings announcement is made. If there were such 
activity prior to the announcement, we would expect to see abnormal trading volumes and 
security prices, and hence returns, creep up (down) as informed traders revise their positions. 
The examination of pre-announcement trading activity for profit upgrades indicates 
abnormal returns and abnormal volume at insignificant levels. These findings are consistent 
with Collett (2004) in a comparative study of UK firms, and we are unable to reject the null 
hypothesis that firms do not experience significant positive valuation effects prior to the 
release of profit upgrades. 
The study does find evidence of information leakage and informed trading prior to the 
release of profit warnings by ASX-listed firms during the sample period. While these 
findings largely contradict the UK literature, which indicates continuous disclosure 
regulations effectively reduced information leakage and informed trading to insignificant 
levels (Collett, 2004, Helbok and Walker, 2003), they are consistent with the findings of Mac 
(2002) who reports comparatively less information leakage for positive surprises than 
negative surprises around US earnings announcements.  
Specifically, we find evidence of significant abnormal volumes caused by 
heterogenous investor expectations during the period 2-3 weeks prior to announcement, and 
significant abnormal revenues reflecting a shift in market consensus expectations during the 
period 1-2 weeks prior to announcement. The finding that individual trading activity 
precedes broader market revaluation is in line with Meulbroek (1992) who, in an empirical 
analysis of illegal insider trading, reports that both the amount traded by an informed trader  
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and trade specific characteristics, such as trade size, direction, and frequency, signal the 
presence of an informed trader to the market.  
To conclude, the study considers a range of firm characteristics that may potentially 
influence firm disclosure practices and contribute to the level information asymmetry in the 
market during the pre-announcement period. Previous research has investigated the influence 
of firm size and information content in contributing to information leakage. This study 
further considers the variables of firm growth, capital structure and industry group. 
The cross-sectional analysis indicates a decreasing propensity to selectively disclose 
information contained in unscheduled earnings announcements for those firms experiencing 
an increase in growth, and for those with high levels of debt financing. The relationship 
between firm size and the magnitude of pre-announcements CARs is inconclusive and 
negligible. While the firm-size differential information hypothesis contends that pre-
announcement information production and dissemination is an increasing function of firm 
size (Atiase, 1980), our findings support an ancillary line of reasoning that unscheduled 
announcements occur randomly and hence cannot be predicted in the same way as 
anticipated periodic accounting reports (Ryan and Taffler, 2004). 
Analyses of the announcement information content support the event study 
conclusions indicating insignificant levels of information leakage and informed trading prior 
to the release of profit upgrades. While the primary model produced inconclusive correlation 
between negative announcements and the magnitude of pre-announcement CARs, the 
enlarged model demonstrates that information leakage and informed trading prior to the 
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